Michael West Media has spent weeks mapping the Australian state’s quiet bargain with Palantir and Cellebrite. The picture is not subtle. The scrutiny has been.

Michael West is one of the few Australian journalists still treated, even by people who dislike his conclusions, as a serious operator. A Walkley Award winner, a former Sydney Morning Herald business editor and Australian columnist, he left the old houses in 2016 and built Michael West Media around a single obsession: the rising power of corporations over democracy.

That brief now includes the two companies that, on his site’s account, have become the extractors and the analysts of Australian life. Cellebrite takes the phone. Palantir makes the map. Neither arrangement, West keeps saying, was put to a vote.



The reporting is not one story. It is a sequence. Claudia Weisenberger’s The global reckoning over Palantir and Cellebrite — and the country that never asked sets the international frame. In April, Palantir’s chief executive, Alex Karp, posted a twenty-two-point manifesto drawn from his book The Technological Republic.

Within weeks, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and Germany’s military moved to shrink or refuse the relationship. Switzerland had already said no, repeatedly. A British parliamentary committee called Palantir’s presence in the NHS “an unacceptable point of weakness.”

Australia, Weisenberger writes, did none of this: no review, no audit, no ethics assessment, no minister required to explain why.

West’s own West Report puts the local numbers in one breath.

Twenty-five Australian government agencies now use Palantir, a firm founded with CIA seed money and contracted here since 2012–13. Staff have been embedded in Defence, AUSTRAC, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and the Australian Signals Directorate.



Services Australia has discussed Palantir platforms for the Fraud Fusion Taskforce. The Future Fund, by default after Palantir entered the S&P 500, holds more than $100 million in the stock. The taxpayer is, in Weisenberger’s phrase, simultaneously the subject of the surveillance and a shareholder in the company conducting it.

Cellebrite is the other half of the machine. Senator David Shoebridge has identified 128 active federal contracts worth more than $15 million, a figure that excludes the state and territory police forces, all of which use the technology.

The company strips phones and other devices of messages, photographs, locations, contacts, browsing histories — the residue of a life.

On 2 September its cloud platform, Guardian, completed an IRAP assessment at PROTECTED level. That is not a government certification. It is a security hurdle cleared, and Cellebrite was frank about the point: agencies could move evidence into the cloud and share it among investigators, prosecutors and partner agencies.



Michael Sainsbury’s follow-up, Cellebrite gets Government blessing to share your phone, supplies the human scale. A traveller returning through Perth Airport had his phone taken into another room for half an hour. No warrant. No paperwork. The minister did not answer the query.

NSW, meanwhile, is expanding digital forensics and talking about holding analysed data for up to ninety-nine years, without a clear legal basis for the retention or the destruction. Greens MLC Sue Higginson’s line is the one that stays: there are no reporting requirements, and no known rules for how the downloaded data is stored, used, shared or killed.

The newest piece, AI intrusions, published this week, is colder still. Once extracted, the data can legally sit on servers owned by an Israeli company, governed by Israeli law. Australia, the article argues, has none of the seven oversight provisions that comparable democracies attach to digital extraction.

The United Kingdom has a statutory code. Europe subjects the technology to dual-use export controls. Here the stock answer remains organised crime and terrorism, even as Services Australia has already used Cellebrite in a welfare investigation that produced no charges and a debt chase.

Shoebridge has asked for a full audit of every Cellebrite and Palantir contract. The government has not replied.


West’s method has not changed since the tax and energy inquiries that made his name. He follows the contract, not the press release.

The argument running under this series is not that phones should never be opened or that intelligence agencies should work with pencils. It is that a democracy is supposed to know what it has bought, from whom, under what law, and for how long the copy of a citizen’s life is allowed to live.

Europe has at least begun to ask. Australia, on this evidence, has preferred not to look. That, West’s publication insists, is not an accident. It is a decision.


Further Reading

Claudia Weisenberger, *The global reckoning over Palantir and Cellebrite — and the country that never asked*

Michael West, *Palantir, Cellebrite and the Surveillance Deal Nobody Voted For*

Michael Sainsbury, *Cellebrite gets government blessing to share your phone*

Claudia Weisenberger and Michael West, *AI intrusions. Australia lags the world in safeguarding personal data*.